《供应链管理研究前沿系列讲座》由浙江工商哈哈体育供应链研究所承办，我们将邀请供应链管理领域国内外/校内外知名专家教授分享供应链领域研究前沿，旨在拓展我院师生的研究视野和研究水平。欢迎有兴趣的老师同学参加！
本次讲座形式为“圆桌讨论”。
● 
《Ex post demand information sharing between differentiated suppliers and a common retailer》
主讲人：杨宏林，湖南大学工商哈哈体育 教授、博导
时间：2021/04/29 14:00-17:00
请登录腾讯会议APP扫描参加
内容简介：We consider ex post demand information sharing in a two-echelon supply chain in which two suppliers sell differentiated products through a common retailer. We model three scenarios of information sharing to characterise the conditions under which information sharing may benefit or hurt different players: (1) no supplier is informed; (2) only one supplier is informed; and (3) both suppliers are informed. We find that the retailer may voluntarily share the low demand information when the product differentiation and demand magnitude satisfy certain conditions. In contrast, the retailer has no incentive to share the high demand information, even though this information benefits the suppliers. To achieve information sharing, we propose a side payment mechanism, which allows benefitted players to subsidise hurtful players. Finally, we extend our model by considering a situation where the suppliers have limited capacity and may invest to ramp up production capacity to satisfy a high demand.
● 《Information Sharing and Channel Selection in the Platform Economy》
主讲人：李果，北京理工大学管理与经济学院 教授，博导
时间：2021/04/29 14:00-17:00
请登录腾讯会议APP扫描参加
内容简介：The term platform economy refers to a business practice in which online retailers serve as transaction platforms that connect upstream suppliers with downstream buyers. We investigate an online retailer's incentive for demand information sharing with an upstream supplier who has already built a retail channel but possesses an incentive to establish a commission channel on the retailer's online marketplace. We show that the online retailer can voluntarily share her private demand information with the supplier, and such an action may induce the supplier to establish the commission channel. This inducement effect is in sharp contrast to conventional wisdom. We also consider a variation of the model in which the supplier leads by deciding whether to establish a commission channel before the online retailer's information-sharing decision, and we identify the firms' preferences between the two models.
● 《Optimal Return Shipping Insurance Policy with Consumers’ Anticipated Regret》
主讲人：李刚，西安交通大学哈哈体育 教授，博导
时间：2021/04/29 14:00-17:00
请登录腾讯会议APP扫描参加
内容简介：We study return shipping insurance (RSI) policies prevalent on major online platforms such as Taobao.com and JD.com. Retailers on those platforms can purchase and provide RSI for consumers (RRSI) or offer an option for consumers to buy RSI themselves (CRSI). With either RSI, consumers will be partially compensated by an insurer for their shipping fees associated with product returns. As the consumers' uncertainty about product is realized only after purchase, their decisions whether to purchase CRSI may lead to post-purchase regret. Considering these anticipated regret behaviors, we investigate the optimal RSI policy for a monopolistic online retailer and an insurer. We show that the retailer offers RRSI only if the retailer's return handling cost is relatively low and the return shipping cost is in an intermediate range; otherwise, the consumers' strong propensity for uninsured regret may stimulate them to purchase CRSI. Under the optimal RRSI policy, the retailer always charges a higher product price than under no RSI, and surprisingly the consumer demand could expand. In contrast, under the optimal CRSI policy, the retailer always sets a lower product price, but resulting in consumer demand shrinkage. Counterintuitively, CRSI may become a win-win-win" policy for the retailer, insurer, and consumers.
