《供应链管理研究前沿系列讲座》由浙江财经大学工商哈哈体育供应链研究所承办，我们将邀请供应链管理领域国内外/校内外知名专家教授分享供应链领域研究前沿，旨在拓展我院师生的研究视野和研究水平。欢迎有兴趣的老师同学参加！
本次讲座形式为“圆桌讨论”。
● 《Quality Certification in Agricultural Supply Chains: Implication from Government Information Provision》
主讲人：弋泽龙，深圳大学经济学院 副教授
时间：2021/05/27 14:00-16:00
内容简介：We investigates the implication of government information provision on a farming cooperative's quality certification strategy in an agricultural supply chain, wherein the farming cooperative plants an agricultural product and sells through an intermediary product distributor to the end market. The farming cooperative has some private quality information of its product and can disclose it via quality certification in the planting stage. The product distributor makes the order decision based on the farming cooperative's quality certification, and can observe the exact product quality information only after the product is reaped. During this process, the government provides free but imperfect demand forecasting that helps the farming cooperative make more efficient pricing and quality certification strategies. We show that the impact of quality certification on the farming cooperative's profit highly hinges on three factors: the quality standard and the cost of quality certification, and the precision rate of government's information, in which the farming cooperative's profit exhibits non-monotonic relationship with any of the factors. The farming cooperative may become worse off with the government's free information provision, and a higher information precision rate may result in an up-side jump or a down-side jump for the farming cooperative's profit. In comparison to government information channel, the farming cooperative may choose to costly acquire the demand information by itself that allows it to control the information precision rate. We further demonstrate that our main results hold true when the distributor can determine the retail price and discuss the possible signaling role of wholesale price in our game framework.
● 《Benefits of third-party logistics firms as financing providers》
主讲人：华胜亚，华南师范大学经济与哈哈体育，博士
时间：2021/05/27 14:00-16:00
内容简介：In this paper, we investigate the design of a supplier’s wholesale price contract and a third-party logistics (3PL) firm’s joint logistics and financing services contract in a three-tier supply chain. The retailer can apply for bank financing or 3PL financing for purchasing when necessary. All members engage in a Stackelberg game with the supplier functioning as the leader. Our analysis indicates that the 3PL who finances the retailer with a low interest rate induces the retailer to order more, thereby causing the 3PL to obtain more profit from logistics services. The supplier benefits from 3PL financing by receiving a larger order from the retailer. Compared with bank financing, a retailer whose working capital level is not too low can benefit more with 3PL financing owing to lower purchasing (ordering and transportation costs) and financing costs. We further conclude that all members’ optimal decisions remain unchanged when the 3PL is also capital constrained but can borrow from a bank. We examine the retailer and supplier’s issues when the 3PL functions as the game leader instead of the supplier, and numerically demonstrate that the retailer and 3PL are better off while the supplier is worse off under 3PL leadership. Our results explain why 3PLs are willing to finance retailers’ inventories in business practice and suggest that 3PLs should set low financing interest rates to improve channel performances.
